Tehran’s choices after Israeli strikes in Beirut

When Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on July 31, hours after Masoud Pezeshkian’s presidency was inaugurated, Iranian leaders and military commanders announced that Iran would retaliate against Israel. However, when former nuclear negotiator Abbas Araghchi was confirmed as the new foreign minister, it appeared Pezeshkian’s key priority was to engage the West to lift sanctions; Iran’s move to defer retaliation suggested a retreat amid hopes of a ceasefire in Gaza.
In the meantime, Israel has escalated its year-long campaign of targeted killings to eliminate the leadership of not only Hamas but also of Hezbollah and commanders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps present in Syria and Lebanon. A series of successful Israeli intelligence operations in Lebanon, the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, and the extensive air strikes on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon, Beirut suburbs and Bekka Valley made it clear that Israel was focussed on eliminating the threat on its northern borders.
Iran seemed reconciled to the weakening of Hamas and Hezbollah, which have suffered severe losses in their asymmetric war against Israel. However, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu escalated the rhetoric in a televised address to Iranians. He said Tehran and Tel Aviv would be at peace when Iran is “finally free”, which he said would “come a lot sooner than people think”. Iran may not be taking threats of regime change seriously, but the weakening of Hezbollah has exposed chinks in Iran’s forward defence strategy, leaving it vulnerable.
Under its forward defence strategy, Iran has used its religio-political narrative of the Islamic Revolution and anti-Zionist resistance to support militant groups that have a strong grassroots presence. Hezbollah, Hamas, several Iraqi Shiite groups, and Houthis in Yemen together constitute the region-wide axis of resistance that enables Iran to strike against its enemies at a low cost to itself. As Hezbollah stands weakened, Iran launched its missiles, the other component of its forward defence. Unlike the missile strikes in April, which were intended to be a demonstrative measure, the October 1 strikes against military targets in Israel were without warning. The first-time operational use of Fattah hypersonic missiles, which tested Israel’s air defences, indicated Iran’s willingness to escalate.
While Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has maintained that Iran’s missile strikes were minimal punishment and that it was not seeking war, President Pezeshkian’s declaration that Iran’s one-sided “strategic patience” vis-à-vis Israel was over meant to force Israel to reconsider its expanded regional war aims. Instead, Iran and Israel have climbed up the escalation ladder with neither side willing to accept the other’s deterrent red lines.
Israeli leaders have likened Iran to the head of an octopus and the network of resistance groups to its tentacles. Since the tentacles are temporarily paralysed, Tel Aviv sees an opportunity to strike the head. But a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities or critical infrastructure, as demanded by some hotheads in Israel and the United States, will surely lead to an escalation of the conflict. In fact, Iran has said that it will force them to seek nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent. Iran’s state of nuclear latency already puts some constraints on Israeli actions against Tehran. A potentially extended round of tit-for-tat strikes between Iran and Israel is rife with unpredictable consequences for an already destabilised region.
Deepika Saraswat is associate fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies andAnalyses. The views expressed are personal